• Whenever concepts are combined in a composite query they interact in intricate "non classical" ways.
• Quantum logic as such isn't the perfect match to model this interaction.

When reporters interviewed me in the 70's and 80's about the possibilities for Artificial Intelligence I would always say that we would have machines that are as smart as we are within my lifetime. It seemed a safe answer since no one could ever tell me I was wrong. But I no longer believe that will happen.

It is not that AI needs definition, it is more that AI needs substance

Early AI workers sought out intelligent behaviors to focus on, like chess or problem solving, and tried to build machines that could equal human beings in those same endeavors. While this was an understandable approach it was, in retrospect, wrong-headed.

• prioritizing the problems, looking for the one(s) which are likely to have precedence over others in the (hypothetically assumed) path toward solutions.
  
• reframing one or more know problems into a different question by "stepping back" and trying to find a more general framework within which the pending problems will be seen as only a special case of a more general question (going "meta", see about Jacques PITRAT, the only usefull reference I found since he is not an english speaker).
  

"After all, being the first to solve a given scientific problem, is important.
Science is a winner-takes-all game, at least some of time."

"There is a conflict between competition and cooperation in science.
I feel that conflict myself, but I strive for cooperation.
I have never regretted sharing my ideas."

• "agency" instances where the action is a sitting and the "perpetrator" is a cat.
• "localisation" instances where the place is a mat and the "happenstance" a sitting.
• "modalities" instances where the action is a sitting and the "quality" a quiet mood.

So the questions which arise from this are :

- How do we deal in logic with the "extraneous" arguments to a reified relation which we somehow want to "consider a bit" but not too much since they are only "supplementary" to the core relation?

- Where do we stop the reification, when is it sensible to ALSO reify what was originally just an argument name ('agent' of an action verb for instance) and has been turned to a relation by the previous reification?

- Since the CG kind of formalism is entirely equivalent to First Order Logic (see about the "phi-operator" in Higher-Order KIF and Conceptual Graphs) what does it mean to play around with the "carving out" of various relations from an initial "master formulation" of a problem statement?

To me this means that there is surely an extra degree of freedom involved in the translation from the "intuitive" formulation of a problem into any kind of formalised logic (FOL or even higher) which is almost always OVERLOOKED.

This is one of the basis of my discontent whith the hard core rationalists who seem to have an absolute faith in their formalisations.
They just forget the messy business they had to come up with the said formalisations and keep rehashing irrelevant "metaphysical" considerations about consistency, truth and existence (the Platonists vices...).

While chatting about this with Peter Turney he suggested that Dedre Gentner's paper Why We're So Smart "may be of interest":

You'll need to translate from cognitive psychology to logic, but I think you'll
find that the paper is talking about the power of reifying and de-reifying.

and indeed it is!

She highlighted the critical role of relations in cognition while still viewing them as an instance the more general framework of "a concept":

First, relational concepts are critical to higher-order cognition, but relational concepts are both nonobvious in initial learning and elusive in memory retrieval.

I haven't yet came up with a "translation from cognitive psychology to logic" but I am working on it and will post whatever ruminations I can milk out of this.